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Abstract 
 
This empirical study examines small firms’ strategies towards appropriating the returns to their 
investments in innovation and finds that they are qualitatively different from those found in earlier 
studies of more generally representative samples of firms. First, few of the smallest firms appear to 
benefit from patenting. Even within this sample of small firms, only the largest firms were likely to 
identify patents as the most important method of appropriating innovation returns. Thus, the strategic 
choice for most small firms is between secrecy and speed to market. The smallest firms and those in low 
technology or complex product industries tend to prefer speed, while small investments in R&D, 
discrete product technologies, and affiliation with higher technology industries explain preference for 
trade secrets. These results raise policy questions regarding the functioning of the existing systems of 
intellectual property rights when key policy goals include innovation by and growth of small firms. 
Furthermore, innovation policies that mandate collaboration are likely to significantly influence firms’ 
appropriability strategies. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
Innovators’ ability to benefit from their investments is a central concern in innovation and 
technology policy. Appropriability—firms’ capability to protect and appropriate the returns 
from their innovation activities—has been identified as one of the key incentives for innova-
tion (Levin et al., 1987) and it is thus the justification for the intellectual property rights sys-
tem itself (Gallini, 2002; Kultti, Takalo, & Toikka, 2006). This study explores the special na-
ture of appropriability strategies of small firms. We argue that some of the usual mechanisms 
emphasized in the study of appropriability are not feasible for most small firms and that, con-
sequently, their appropriability strategies are different from larger firms. In particular, the role 
of patents in protecting innovation returns is much less pronounced for most small firms, and 
relatively few firms find trade secrets valuable either.   
 
Small firms have been characterized as the “fruit flies of innovation” (de Jong & Marsili, 
2006); they are a very dynamic and interesting subset of innovating organizations. In particu-
lar, innovative entry to existing industries can change the competitive dynamics and overtake 
even highly established and successful incumbents (Audretsch, 1995; Christensen & Rosen-
bloom, 1995; Henderson & Clark, 1990). Arguably, the competitive fringe is very important 
in providing the constant innovative challenge to incumbents (Scherer, 1980; Gilbert & New-
bery, 1982). However, it hasn’t been studied in detail how small firms protect their returns to 
innovation investments. It has generally been assumed that small firms rely on similar strate-
gies as larger firms do (although see Arundel, 2001; Kitching & Blackburn, 1998). However, 
this study demonstrates that, most likely for lack of resources and for specific vertical de-
pendencies, small firms’ appropriability strategies are qualitatively different from those of 
more established innovators. 
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In a statistical analysis of a sample of small and innovative Finnish manufacturing and service 
firms, our study finds that the benefits of patenting strongly depend on firm size. Most small 
firms are not able to benefit from patents, and, consequently, their choice of primary appro-
priability mechanism is between secrecy and speed. Process innovators and firms in higher 
technology industries are more likely to emphasize trade secrets, while the smallest firms and 
those in lower technology industries are likely to rely on speed to market. Even highly R&D 
intensive small firms are no more likely than their less innovative counterparts to choose pat-
ents as their preferred mechanism to protect intellectual assets. Instead, R&D intensive small 
firms tend to rely on speed rather than patents or secrecy, but, on the other hand, small firms 
in R&D intensive industries tend to prefer secrecy to protect their innovations. In other words, 
firms that are more R&D intensive than their industry peers are the most likely to prefer speed 
to market as a means of appropriability. 
 
We also find strong evidence that vertical innovation cooperation has significant implications 
for appropriability strategy. In particular, firms with vertical collaborative innovation ar-
rangements are statistically significantly more likely than other firms to rely on speed instead 
of secrecy to appropriate innovation returns. We interpret this in the light of small firms’ bar-
gaining power within vertical cooperative arrangements. The firms in our sample are most 
probably dealing with partners larger than themselves, in which case they are in a relatively 
weak position to appropriate intellectual outputs from joint work. Moreover, as previously 
stated, patenting may not be a feasible strategy simply for lack of resources to apply for and 
defend patents. In an intense cooperative arrangement, secrecy is not likely to work either, 
inasmuch as partners are able to learn and pass on to third parties the technology secrets of the 
focal small firm. Hence, firms with cooperative innovation projects with vertical partners are 
found to rely mostly on speed to market. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss the state of the literature on ap-
propriability and interfirm cooperation and articulate a set of existing and new hypotheses 
about small firms’ strategies to protect innovation returns. Then we introduce the Finnish sur-
vey dataset of small firms and carry out the empirical analyses. The last section discusses the 
implications of our empirical results and concludes. 
 
2 Recent literature on appropriability  
 
 
A number of studies have been completed to gain an understanding of how firms choose be-
tween the various mechanisms for the appropriation of the benefits from innovative activities.  
These studies show that the type of innovative activity along with both firm and industry 
characteristics play important roles in a firm’s choice of primary appropriability mechanism.   
 
Harabi (1995) defines five appropriability mechanisms: patents, secrecy, lead time, moving 
quickly down the learning curve, and sales and service efforts.  While firms generally rank 
patents as inferior to other appropriability mechanisms (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; 
Harabi, 1995), certain firm characteristics or strategies may nevertheless give rise to reliance 
on patenting to protect innovations. In particular, firm size, high investments in research and 
development, and engaging in inter-firm cooperation are found to increase the likelihood of 
patenting (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel, 2001). Additionally, 
product innovations are more likely to be patented than process innovations, which are usually 
more effectively protected with trade secrets (Harabi, 1995). A process innovation is more eas-
ily kept within a firm, while a product must be released to the market at large. Therefore, for 
process innovations, the legal protection offered by patents may not be worth the mandatory 
disclosure of information about the innovation associated with the patent application. 
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Arundel (2001) argues that while larger firms are more likely to patent, smaller firms rely 
mainly on secrecy to protect their innovations. Small firms often lack the resources necessary 
to legally defend their patents when necessary (Cohen et al. 2000), and moreover, their patent 
enforcement costs are likely to be higher because they rarely benefit from cross-licensing ar-
rangements or aggressive IPR strategy reputation effects (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001). 
Overall, however, large firms tend to rate all appropriability mechanisms as more effective 
than do small firms (Arundel, 2001). Small firms thus appear to perceive the “same” indus-
trial environment as weaker for appropriability than do large firms—who simply have more 
resources and market power to defend their intellectual property. 
 
Another firm characteristic that may influence the choice of appropriability mechanism is in-
volvement in inter-firm cooperation. Firms that engage in cooperative arrangements with 
other firms benefit from both specialized knowledge of their partners and the interactive 
learning that takes place in a joint R&D project (Sobrero & Roberts, 2002).  It can be argued 
that R&D cooperation with other firms increases the value of patenting because patents help 
to define partners’ rights to emerging intellectual property explicitly, and moreover, firms can 
use their portfolio of patents as bargaining chips in negotiations with potential partners over 
cross-licensing arrangements and the ownership of the joint R&D output (Cohen et al. 2002). 
For smaller firms, however, patenting may not be an option due to aforementioned resource 
constraints, and, consequently, larger cooperation partners may use their bargaining power to 
demand ownership of intellectual property that results from joint innovation. Indeed, Cassiman 
and Veugelers (2002) suggest that vertical cooperation is negatively associated with the effec-
tiveness of all appropriability mechanisms. Along with weaker bargaining ability of small firms, 
this leads us to expect that small firms that have cooperative arrangements with suppliers or cli-
ents would not find the use of patents or trade secrets particularly advantageous.  
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Industry-specific characteristics also influence a firm’s choice of appropriability mechanism.  
For example, according to Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999), firms’ propensity to patent is 
higher in high technology industries than in other industries. Cohen et al. (2000) divide indus-
tries into those producing discrete or complex products and argue that firms patent for differ-
ent reasons in these two types of industries.  Discrete products, such as food or chemicals, 
have few components, and as such, innovations in these areas are simpler to protect by pat-
ents. In contrast, complex products, for example, electronics products or machinery, may re-
quire many different components in their construction or development. Cohen et al. argue that 
an innovation in these areas often requires licensing or other arrangements to gain access to 
technologies from other firms, making commercializing an innovation more challenging. 
Therefore, patenting is pursued in complex product industries for strategically different rea-
sons than in discrete product industries. However, small firms typically don’t have extensive 
patent portfolios to cross-license from, which makes operating in a complex product environ-
ment difficult. This may induce small complex product firms to steer away from technologies 
and products where such strategic patenting is necessary. Thus, a small firm in a complex 
product industry may instead decide to focus on product areas where they can effectively 
compete by getting to market quickly or by providing superior marketing and complementary 
services in lieu of patents. Moreover, it is typically much easier to invent around technologies 
in the engineering-based industries that Cohen et al. call complex product industries than it is 
in discrete product industries. This reduces the incentive to patent, and may make firms more 
inclined to rely on time to market as the competitive asset.  
 
In the empirical analyses to follow, we utilize data from a survey of small Finnish firms.1  
Four explicit appropriability mechanisms are identified in the survey: patents, secrecy, speed 
                                                 
1   Fewer than 100 employees, of which a large majority have fewer than 50 employees. 
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to market, and complementary production, products, or services.  Firms were asked to identify 
which of these mechanisms is the most important for protecting their innovations. We attempt 
to explain small firms’ choice of preferred appropriability mechanism with a set of firm- and 
industry-level characteristics. Explanatory firm-level variables include firm size, R&D expen-
ditures, exports, type of innovation (product or process), and cooperative arrangements.  In-
dustry-specific variables include technology sector dummies for firms in high technology 
manufacturing industries, medium-high technology manufacturing industries, high technology 
and R&D intensive service industries, and other industries. We also divide the firms in the 
sample into discrete and complex product firms using the Cohen et al. (2000) approach. 
 
Based on the literature reviewed above, we expect that firms in high technology and discrete 
product industries are more likely than those in lower technology or complex product indus-
tries to rate patents as their most important appropriability mechanism. We also expect that 
being involved in product innovation increases the likelihood of rating patents as the most ef-
fective appropriability mechanism, while secrecy is expected to be more effective for process 
innovations. It is also possible, however, that small firms rely on secrecy to protect both prod-
uct and process innovations (Arundel, 2001). Furthermore, we expect a larger firm size to in-
crease the likelihood of rating patents as the preferred appropriability mechanism.   
 
To examine the effect of small firms’ external relationships on their appropriability strategies, 
we utilize survey information concerning firms’ engagement in cooperative innovation activi-
ties with competitors or with other firms (clients, suppliers, or other commercial organiza-
tions). The survey also asks whether firms generate more than one-third of their procurement 
or sales from a single supplier or a single client, respectively. Many small firms have these 
kinds of partnerships with (usually larger) suppliers and clients. The reason for focusing on 
these relationships is that both vertical innovation cooperation and vertical partnerships are 
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likely to expose a great deal of the focal firm’s proprietary know-how to the partner. Further-
more, the cooperation partner’s most likely stronger bargaining power may put the small firm at 
a disadvantage in terms of defending its intellectual assets against appropriation by the partner. 
Small firms may not have the resources to patent their intellectual property and thereby estab-
lish more explicit legal rights. Then, neither patents nor secrecy may be viable options for pro-
tecting their innovations. Instead, we expect to find that speed to market is the only recourse of 
innovative firms in intensive partnerships or cooperative innovation arrangements. 
 
3 The dataset of small knowledge-intensive Finnish firms 
 
 
The survey data were collected by ETLA and are described in detail by Hyytinen and Pa-
jarinen (2003; 2005). Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) utilized the same database in their study 
of small innovating firms’ financial constraints. The first survey wave collected in 2002 sam-
pled 2 600 small and medium-sized Finnish firms in all economic sectors except agriculture, 
finance, and real estate. 936 firms responded resulting in a response rate of 36 percent.  The 
initial purpose of the survey was to describe the financial characteristics of small and me-
dium-sized Finnish firms, with an emphasis on high technology firms.  The survey, therefore, 
oversamples firms in high technology, medium high technology, and information intensive 
service sectors relative to the entire population of small Finnish firms. These kinds of firms 
account for about 60 percent of the sample. The second survey, collected in 2003, targeted the 
respondents from the previous survey, resulting in 830 responses. The main purpose of the 
second survey was to identify the consumption of publicly provided business services by 
small and medium-sized Finnish firms.   
 
From the first survey, we use the information about the number of employees, research and 
development expenditures, partnerships with clients and suppliers, innovation activities, tech-
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nology classifications, and export orientation. The data cover the years 2000 or 2001, depend-
ing which was the most recent year of data available to the survey respondent. Descriptions of 
all variables are shown in table 1.  
 
Table 1  Variable descriptions 
Appropriability mechanisms Description  
PATENTS Patents are the most important appropriability mechanism 
SECRECY Secrecy is the most important appropriability mechanism 
SPEED Speed to market is the most important appropriability mechanism 
OTHER APPRO Complementary production, products, services or other means are the most important appropriability mechanism 
Continuous variables   
EMPLOYEES Number of Employees 
R&D Expenditures R&D expenditures (Euros) 
Log (R&D) Natural logarithm of R&D expenditures (Euros), 0 R&D expenditures set to 0 
Binary variables   
EXPORTS 1 if firm has any exports, 0 otherwise 
PRODUCT INNOVATION  1 if firm claims only a product innovation in past                     three years, 0 otherwise 
PROCESS INNOVATION  1 if firm claims only a process innovation in past three years, 0 otherwise 
BOTH INNOVATION  1 if firm claims both product and process innovations in past three years, 0 otherwise 
COOP HORZ  1 if firm has cooperated in innovation with firms in the same industry, 0 otherwise 
COOP VERT 1 if firm has cooperated in innovation with suppliers, cli-ents, or consultants, 0 otherwise 
  
PARTNER 
  
1 if firm has either a client with share of sales or a supplier 
with share of procurement greater than 33%, 0 otherwise 
DISCRETE  Discrete products, 1 if firms has SIC < 2900, 0 otherwise 
HIGH TECH 1 if firm is classified as a "high tech" business, 0 otherwise 
MED HIGH TECH  1 if firm is classified as a "medium high tech" business, 0 otherwise 
R&D SERVICES  1 if firm is classified as a "R&D and technology intensive services" business, 0 otherwise 
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Firm size is measured by the number of employees in the firm. The average firm in the esti-
mation samples has about 13 employees, ranging from 1 to 97 employees. The natural loga-
rithm of R&D, research and development expenditures in thousands of Euros, is used to con-
trol for the extent of the firm’s innovation activity. Types of innovation outcomes were de-
termined through a set of binary questions. Firms were asked whether they had introduced a 
process innovation in the previous three years, and similarly for product innovations.  EX-
PORTS is also a binary variable indicating whether the firm reported exporting any products. 
To assess the role of vertical relationships, firms were asked whether they had a client or a 
supplier that accounted for more than one third of their sales or procurement.  We combine 
these answers to create a binary variable, PARTNER, which takes the value unity if the firm 
identifies either a client that accounts for more than one third of sales or a supplier that ac-
counts for more than one third of its procurement and zero otherwise. About half of the firms 
in the sample have such intensive partnerships.2  
 
Another aspect of vertical dependence is represented by cooperative innovation arrangements. 
Our measures of firms’ cooperative activities are taken from the second (2003) survey. Firms 
were asked whether they had cooperated in innovative activities with firms in the same indus-
try and whether they had cooperated with supplier, clients, or consultants.  The variable, 
COOP HORZ, indicates whether the firm answered the first question affirmatively, while 
COOP VERT indicates if the firm answered the second question affirmatively. About half of 
the sampled firms engaged in vertical cooperation and two thirds in horizontal cooperation. It 
is thus very common for innovative small firms to cooperate in their R&D activities.   
 
                                                 
2   An earlier analysis separated PARTNER into its client and supplier parts, but this did not provide any more 
empirical insight. The combined variable better represents the underlying firm characteristic of interest: depend-
ence on a vertical partner. 
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Technology class definitions are taken directly from Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2003) who use 
the OECD definitions to create dummies for high technology (HIGH TECH) and medium-
high technology (MEDIUM HIGH TECH) manufacturing industries. A separate dummy is 
also defined for R&D or technology intensive services (R&D SERVICES: telecommunica-
tions, software, R&D services, and technical services), while the reference group includes low 
technology manufacturing industries. Additionally, DISCRETE is an indicator for firms 
whose products fit Cohen’s (1991) definition of discrete products.  
 
Finally, the dependent variables come from the 2003 survey, where firms were asked which 
appropriability mechanism was the most important to them: patents, secrecy, complementary 
production or services, speed (being faster to market than competitors), or other appropriabil-
ity mechanisms. The variables PATENTS, SECRECY, and SPEED are thus mutually exclu-
sive binary variables. Over half of the sample prefers speed to market as a means to protect 
innovations, about a quarter of the firms prefer patents, while only 17 percent of them prefer 
secrecy. Thus, the majority of the sampled firms protect their innovations outside of the legal 
intellectual property rights system.3  
 
To keep our focus on small firms, we remove 32 firm observations that had more than 100 
employees and 1 observation with 5 million Euros in R&D expenditures, which was nearly 
twice the magnitude of the next largest observation.  Then, combining the two surveys results 
in 773 observations of firms that participated in both surveys.  However, data were unavail-
able for 347 observations on the cooperation variables, 139 observations on R&D expendi-
tures, 100 observations on the dependent variables, and 1 observation on the industry classifi-
                                                 
3   It should be noted though that this survey did not specifically ask about the use of copyright, which may be 
relevant in particular for firms in software services, or trade names and trademarks. These are all included in the 
“other” category. 
  
11
cation. After deleting observations with missing data, our final estimation sample contains 
312 observations. If the cooperation variables are not included, we can use a secondary sam-
ple of 533 observations. Table A1 in the appendix shows summary statistics for all 773 avail-
able observations, and tables 2 and 3 below display summary statistics for the two estimation 
samples; with or without the cooperation variables.   
 
Table 2  Summary statistics for estimation sample 1 (N=533) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
R&D expenditures (Euros) 72 185.64 201 014.5 0 2 356 906 
EMPLOYEES 12.8330 15.4386 1 97 
EXPORTS 0.3865 0.4874 0 1 
PRODUCT INNOVATION 0.2120 0.4091 0 1 
PROCESS INNOVATION 0.0901 0.2865 0 1 
BOTH INNOVATION 0.2345 0.4241 0 1 
PARTNER 0.5159 0.5002 0 1 
DISCRETE 0.2008 0.4009 0 1 
HIGH TECH 0.1201 0.3254 0 1 
MED HIGH TECH 0.2795 0.4492 0 1 
R&D SERVICES 0.2026 0.4023 0 1 
PATENTS 0.2645 0.4415 0 1 
SECRECY 0.1670 0.3733 0 1 
SPEED 0.5685 0.4958 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 3  Summary statistics for estimation sample 2 (N=312) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
R&D expenditures (Euros) 112 245.9 251 099.2 0 2 356 906 
EMPLOYEES 13.6442 16.6264 1 97 
EXPORTS 0.4936 0.5008 0 1 
PRODUCT INNOVATION 0.2949 0.4567 0 1 
PROCESS INNOVATION 0.0769 0.2669 0 1 
BOTH INNOVATION 0.3365 0.4733 0 1 
PARTNER 0.5000 0.5008 0 1 
COOP HORZ 0.6635 0.4733 0 1 
COOP VERT 0.5192 0.5004 0 1 
DISCRETE 0.1506 0.3583 0 1 
HIGH TECH 0.1442 0.3519 0 1 
MED HIGH TECH 0.2949 0.4567 0 1 
R&D SERVICES 0.2853 0.4523 0 1 
PATENTS 0.2724 0.4459 0 1 
SECRECY 0.1635 0.3704 0 1 
SPEED 0.5641 0.4967 0 1 
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The summary statistics show some biases in the estimation samples relative to all available 
observations. When the cooperation variables are not included, the sample of 533 observa-
tions shows a slight bias toward R&D intensive firms.  The mean of R&D expenditures is 72 
186 euros compared to 66 705 euros for the full set of observations. The final estimation sam-
ple of 312 firms, however, shows more significant differences.  The mean of R&D expendi-
tures for the estimation sample is 112 246 euros.  Lower R&D spending firms were thus less 
likely to complete the full survey.  The smaller estimation sample also contains a greater pro-
portion of exporters (50 percent vs. 38 percent), a greater proportion of product innovators (29 
percent vs. 22 percent) and a correspondingly greater proportion of firms that introduced both 
product and process innovations (33 percent vs. 21 percent) than the sample of all available 
observations. Finally, the smaller estimation sample contains a lower proportion of firms from 
discrete product industries (15 percent vs. 21 percent) and greater proportions of high tech-
nology firms and R&D intensive service firms (14 percent vs. 11 percent, and 29 percent vs. 
20 percent, respectively). All other discrepancies are within two percent. In sum, the final es-
timation sample of 312 observations is somewhat biased towards innovation- and export-
intensive firms. However, we believe this bias is not a serious problem since we are interested 
in the relationships between firms’ innovation and cooperation activities and their strategies to 
protect the returns from these activities. A focus on innovation-oriented firms is then natural. 
It is nevertheless useful to keep in mind when interpreting the results that they apply to a set 
of randomly sampled innovation-oriented and high technology-based small firms. 
 
4  Empirical analyses of the choice of appropriability strategy 
 
 
We begin by estimating simple probit models for each of the identified appropriability mecha-
nisms. We model the discrete choice of each appropriability mechanism as a function of the 
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number of employees, R&D expenditures (recorded as their natural logarithms, with zero ex-
penditures set at zero), interfirm cooperation, exports, and technology class:  
 
Pr(Appropriability Mechanism) =  f (Employees, R&D, Cooperation, Technology ) + ε ; 
 
where the ε are iid random variables.  
 
We present three specifications of each discrete choice model.  While we are particularly inter-
ested in the effects of interfirm cooperation on the choice of appropriability mechanism, the sur-
vey dataset contains many missing observations on vertical and horizontal cooperation.  There-
fore, for each appropriability mechanism, we build toward the final model by adding variables. 
Model 1 is estimated with all of the variables described above except PARTNER and the coopera-
tion variables. PARTNER is added in model 2, and in model 3 we add the cooperation variables.   
 
The results from the probit models for PATENTS, SECRECY, and SPEED are presented in ta-
bles 4, 5, and 6, respectively. The patent models in table 4 display a strong positive relationship 
between firm size as measured by the number of employees and the probability that a firm will 
rate patents as their most effective appropriability mechanism, significant at the 99 percent con-
fidence level in all three specifications. None of the other variables is significant. Partner and 
cooperation variables do not seem to add any valuable information, either. We can judge the 
overall fit of these regressions by calculating the proportion of correct predictions of the de-
pendent variable. For this regression, even though all three models predict roughly 73 percent of 
observations correctly, this is not much better than blindly guessing that no firms rated patents as 
the most effective appropriability mechanism (72.8 percent correctly classified). Thus, we con-
clude that the overall fit of this model is rather poor. Moreover, the likelihood ratio test, which 
tests the hypothesis that all coefficients are simultaneously zero cannot be rejected for model 3.  
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Table 4  Probit results for PATENTS 
  MODEL 1   MODEL 2   MODEL 3   
N 533  533  312  
Log Likelihood -298.3609  -297.8220  -174.4820  
LR 19.16 ** 20.24 ** 16.49  
Correctly classified 73.73%   73.55%   73.08%   
VARIABLE Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   
Log(R&D)  0.0164  0.0160  -0.0032  
 (0.0154)  (0.0155)  (0.0221)  
EMPLOYEES 0.0091 ** 0.0088 ** 0.0126 *** 
 (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0047)  
EXPORTS 0.0385  0.0262  0.1907  
 (0.1350)  (0.1357)  (0.1739)  
PRODUCT INNOVATION -0.0356  -0.0362  -0.0482  
 (0.1736)  (0.1739)  (0.2186)  
PROCESS INNOVATION 0.2420  0.2484  0.0497  
 (0.2160)  (0.2165)  (0.3196)  
BOTH INNOVATION -0.0375  -0.0369  -0.0680  
 (0.1703)  (0.1704)  (0.2192)  
PARTNER   -0.1244  -0.0089  
   (0.1199)  (0.1580)  
COOP HORZ     0.1047  
     (0.1711)  
COOP VERT     0.0785  
     (0.1596)  
DISCRETE 0.2058  0.2140  0.2194  
 (0.1680)  (0.1681)  (0.2374)  
HIGH TECH 0.0175  0.0290  -0.0197  
 (0.2174)  (0.2182)  (0.2785)  
MED HIGH TECH 0.2068  0.2146  0.1729  
 (0.1670)  (0.1673)  (0.2339)  
R&D SERVICES -0.0112  -0.0079  -0.0265  
 (0.1989)  (0.1991)  (0.2526)  
Constant -0.9951 *** -0.9277 *** -1.0144 *** 
  (0.1356)   (0.1500)   (0.2566)   
*, **, *** signify significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% level of confidence  
(Standard errors in parentheses)      
 
 
The results are slightly stronger for the secrecy models (table 5). Here, firms with limited 
R&D expenditures are likely to rate secrecy as their most important appropriability mecha-
nism. Furthermore, consistent with earlier studies, model 3 shows that firms with process in-
novations are weakly more likely to rely on secrecy to appropriate the returns from their inno-
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vative activities. The results for the secrecy model also show that firms with cooperative in-
novation arrangements with suppliers or clients are less likely to choose secrecy as their most 
important appropriability mechanism. This lends support for our hypothesis that for SME’s 
with vertical cooperative arrangements involving innovative activities, trade secrets may not 
be a viable appropriation strategy.  
 
Table 5  Probit results for SECRECY 
  MODEL 1   MODEL 2   MODEL 3   
N 533  533  312  
Log Likelihood -226.5788  -225.8454  -120.4851  
LR 27.68 *** 29.14 *** 36.94 *** 
Correctly classified 83.30%   83.30%   84.29%   
VARIABLE Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   
Log(R&D)  -0.0463 *** -0.0469 *** -0.0500 ** 
 (0.0166)  (0.0167)  (0.0240)  
EMPLOYEES 0.0026  0.0022  0.0011  
 (0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0061)  
EXPORTS -0.1825  -0.2041  -0.2910  
 (0.1571)  (0.1587)  (0.2130)  
PRODUCT INNOVATION -0.2432  -0.2446  -0.2284  
 (0.2042)  (0.2049)  (0.2684)  
PROCESS INNOVATION 0.1842  0.2019  0.6285 * 
 (0.2460)  (0.2462)  (0.3376)  
BOTH INNOVATION 0.2557  0.2561  0.2808  
 (0.1845)  (0.1851)  (0.2507)  
PARTNER   -0.1646  -0.1673  
   (0.1361)  (0.1907)  
COOP HORZ     -0.1588  
     (0.1966)  
COOP VERT     -0.5414 *** 
     (0.1912)  
DISCRETE 0.5299 *** 0.5340 *** 0.6442 ** 
 (0.1875)  (0.1878)  (0.2673)  
HIGH TECH 0.7773 *** 0.8038 *** 0.8159 *** 
 (0.2333)  (0.2344)  (0.3091)  
MED HIGH TECH 0.4169 ** 0.4353 ** 0.2674  
 (0.1910)  (0.1920)  (0.2839)  
R&D SERVICES 0.6979 *** 0.7033 *** 0.6829 ** 
 (0.2215)  (0.2219)  (0.2924)  
Constant -1.1554 *** -1.0687 *** -0.6620 ** 
  (0.1529)   (0.1683)   (0.2902)   
*, **, *** signify significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels of confidence  
(Standard errors in parentheses)      
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As far as the industry characteristics, we find that firms in discrete product industries are 
highly likely to rate secrecy as their most important appropriability mechanism, contrary to 
Cohen’s observation that these firms generally are likely to benefit from blocking competitors 
from imitating.  However, this is consistent with our hypothesis that small firms generally 
tend to find patents financially prohibitive. Finally, all technology class dummies show a posi-
tive relationship with the choice of secrecy as the most effective appropriability mechanism, 
with the coefficients on high technology manufacturing and R&D intensive services signifi-
cant at the 95 percent level, relative to the base case of low technology firms.  
 
The secrecy models correctly classify between 83 percent and 84 percent of the observations 
in the sample. These numbers are similar to the blind guess of no firms indicating secrecy as 
their most effective appropriability mechanism (83.7 percent correctly classified).  However, 
the likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that all coefficients are simultaneously zero at 
the 99 percent confidence level for all three specifications.   
 
The results for the last set of probit models suggest a negative relationship between the choice 
of speed as the most important appropriability mechanism and all three technology class 
dummies (table 6). Firms making discrete products are also significantly less likely to prefer 
speed. In complex product industries, patents are used defensively (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001) 
which requires deep patent portfolio and other resources unlikely to be available to the sam-
pled firms. The coefficients for the EMPLOYEES variable imply that that the smallest firms 
are the most likely to choose speed to market as their most important appropriability method. 
The second specification for speed also shows a positive relationship between speed and the 
existence of an intensive vertical partnership, but this result is not robust to specification as its 
magnitude and significance decline when the cooperation variables are added in model 3. The 
coefficient on the vertical cooperation variable is positive and significant at the 90 percent 
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level. There is thus weak evidence that speed is the choice appropriability mechanism for 
SME’s with vertical cooperative innovation arrangements. The results for the speed models 
also show that firms with higher R&D expenditures are weakly more likely to prefer speed. 
 
Table 6  Probit results for SPEED 
  MODEL 1   MODEL 2   MODEL 3   
N 533  533  312  
Log Likelihood -349.6747  -348.0552  -199.3888  
LR 29.52 *** 32.75 *** 28.60 *** 
Correctly classified 60.98%   62.66%   64.10%   
VARIABLE Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   
Log(R&D) 0.0186  0.0195  0.0363 * 
 (0.0143)  (0.0144)  (0.0208)  
EMPLOYEES -0.0098 ** -0.0093 ** -0.0130 *** 
 (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0049)  
EXPORTS 0.0732  0.0935  -0.0029  
 (0.1285)  (0.1293)  (0.1665)  
PRODUCT INNOVATION 0.1458  0.1442  0.1401  
 (0.1635)  (0.1641)  (0.2087)  
PROCESS INNOVATION -0.3383  -0.3531 * -0.4917 * 
 (0.2116)  (0.2125)  (0.3066)  
BOTH INNOVATION -0.1580  -0.1593  -0.1107  
 (0.1578)  (0.1582)  (0.2058)  
PARTNER   0.2027 * 0.0634  
   (0.1127)  (0.1500)  
COOP HORZ     0.0315  
     (0.1612)  
COOP VERT     0.2444 * 
     (0.1497)  
DISCRETE -0.5027 *** -0.5168 *** -0.5832 *** 
 (0.1600)  (0.1607)  (0.2318)  
HIGH TECH -0.5327 *** -0.5572 *** -0.5093 ** 
 (0.2003)  (0.2013)  (0.2609)  
MED HIGH TECH -0.4460 *** -0.4622 *** -0.3780 * 
 (0.1581)  (0.1587)  (0.2263)  
R&D SERVICES -0.4421 ** -0.4512 ** -0.4244 * 
 (0.1831)  (0.1838)  (0.2357)  
Constant 0.5665 *** 0.4572 *** 0.2809  
  (0.1245)   (0.1385)   (0.2387)   
*, **, *** signify significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels of confidence  
(Standard errors in parentheses)      
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The speed model correctly classifies 61.54 percent of the observations, which is better than a 
blind guess of no firms choosing speed as their most important appropriability mechanism 
(50.32 percent correctly classified). A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that all coef-
ficients are simultaneously zero at the 95 percent confidence level.   
 
The mutually exclusive nature of our dependent variables in the probit models allows us to 
further examine the choice of appropriability mechanism through the estimation of a multi-
nomial logit model. The multinomial logit method takes into account the other alternatives 
when estimating the effects of the factors behind any one choice, thus giving us a clearer view 
of the respondents’ choice situation. These results are presented in table 7. Because very few 
firms indicated complementary production or services or “other” as their most important ap-
propriability mechanism, we combine the two responses and include them in SPEED. SPEED 
AND OTHER is the base case for comparison.  The likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis 
that all coefficients are simultaneously zero at the 99 percent confidence level for all three 
specifications. The Hausman test for the IIA assumption is accepted, implying that the results 
are invariant to dropping any of the alternatives from the models. 
 
The multinomial logit results are broadly aligned with the probit models. One of the few dif-
ferences involves the coefficient for discrete products that is positive and significant for 
PATENTS in models 1 and 3, but this is not robust to adding the vertical relationship vari-
ables (and simultaneously estimating using the smaller sample). Meanwhile, taking into ac-
count other appropriability choices, the main drivers of the choice of SECRECY as the pre-
ferred appropriability mechanism remain process innovations, discrete technology products, 
and affiliation with a high-technology or R&D service industry. Firms with a vertical innova-
tion arrangement, on the other hand, are significantly less likely to choose secrecy.  
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Table 7  Multinomial logit results 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
N 533  533   312  
Log Likelihood -492.7725  -491.1899   -275.9252  
LR 50.31***  53.47***  55.48***  
  PATENTS   SECRECY  PATENTS  SECRECY   PATENTS   SECRECY   
Hausmann IIA   -3.832  0.29  9.751 -0.632   8.615  0.03   
VARIABLE Coeff   Coeff  Coeff Coeff   Coeff   Coeff   
Log(R&D)  0.0061  -0.0859 *** 0.0048  -0.0873 *** -0.0329  -0.1078 ** 
  (0.0277)  (0.0314)   (0.0278)  (0.0316)   (0.0398)  (0.0457)   
EMPLOYEES 0.0176 *** 0.0114   0.0170 ** 0.0105   0.0239 *** 0.0126   
  (0.0068)  (0.0090)   (0.0068)  (0.0091)   (0.0086)  (0.0120)   
EXPORTS -0.0031  -0.3056   -0.0382  -0.3394   0.2324  -0.3871   
  (0.2370)  (0.2961)   (0.2392)  (0.2983)   (0.3072)  (0.4005)   
-0.1270  -0.4749   -0.1270  -0.4725   -0.1469  -0.4413   PRODUCT IN-
NOVATION 
  (0.3034)  (0.3915)   (0.3047)  (0.3929)   (0.3864)  (0.5085)   
0.5481  0.5656   0.5680  0.5928   0.4493  1.2936 * PROCESS IN-
NOVATION 
  (0.3828)  (0.4704)   (0.3834)  (0.4708)   (0.5986)  (0.6366)   
0.0882  0.5289   0.0922  0.5277   0.0045  0.5416   BOTH INNO-
VATION 
  (0.2980)  (0.3427)   (0.2992)  (0.3445)   (0.3853)  (0.4731)   
PARTNER       -0.2978  -0.3631   -0.0448  -0.2696   
        (0.2121)  (0.2532)   (0.2798)  (0.3549)   
COOP HORZ             0.1064  -0.2915   
              (0.3046)  (0.3656)   
COOP VERT             -0.0855  -0.9967 ***
              (0.2796)  (0.3638)   
DISCRETE 0.6079 ** 1.1639 *** 0.6319  1.1831 *** 0.7065 * 1.4697 ***
  (0.2985)  (0.3584)   (0.2999)  (0.3588)   (0.4295)  (0.5127)   
HIGH TECH 0.3905  1.5677 *** 0.4308  1.6144 *** 0.3505  1.6597 ***
  (0.3903)  (0.4373)   (0.3918)  (0.4391)   (0.5029)  (0.5996)   
0.5552 * 0.9812 *** 0.5787 * 1.0112 *** 0.4748  0.7569   MED HIGH 
TECH 
  (0.2946)  (0.3695)   (0.2960)  (0.3706)   (0.4122)  (0.5515)   
R&D SER-
VICES 0.2853  1.4068 *** 0.3039  1.4144 *** 0.2700  1.4497 ** 
  (0.3543)  (0.4236)   (0.3553)  (0.4244)   (0.4498)  (0.5726)   
Constant -1.4791 *** -1.8452 *** -1.3179 *** -1.6488 *** -1.2746 *** -0.9826 * 
  (0.2427)   (0.3009)   (0.2669)   (0.3274)   (0.4589)   (0.5556)   
*, **, *** signify significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% levels of confidence      
(Standard errors in parentheses)           
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Table 8  Marginal Effects 
 PATENTS  SECRECY  SPEED4  
 PROBIT  MLOGIT  PROBIT  MLOGIT  PROBIT  MLOGIT  
Variable dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   
Log(R&D)  -0.0011  -0.0028  -0.0106 ** -0.0109 ** 0.0144 * 0.0136  
 (0.0072)  (0.0076)  (0.0051)  (0.0048)  (0.0083)  (0.0084)  
EMPLOYEES 0.0041 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0002  0.0006  -0.0031  -0.0049 ***
 (0.0015)  (0.0016)  (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0019)  (0.0020)  
EXPORTS 0.0624  0.0607  -0.0613  -0.0516  0.0061  -0.0091  
 (0.0568)  (0.0594)  (0.0446)  (0.0430)  (0.0657)  (0.0659)  
-0.0157  -0.0147  -0.0457  -0.0416  0.0230  0.0564  PRODUCT  
INNOVATION (0.0706)  (0.0742)  (0.0506)  (0.0485)  (0.0820)  (0.0812)  
0.0165  0.0181  0.1721  0.1755  -0.1558 * -0.1936  PROCESS  
INNOVATION (0.1072)  (0.1143)  (0.1119)  (0.1162)  (0.1145)  (0.1240)  
-0.0221  -0.0200  0.0624  0.0647  -0.1216  -0.0447  BOTH  
INNOVATION (0.0707)  (0.0732)  (0.0584)  (0.0575)  (0.0802)  (0.0822)  
PARTNER -0.0029  0.0007  -0.0353  -0.0286  0.0686  0.0279  
 (0.0517)  (0.0544)  (0.0401)  (0.0382)  (0.0591)  (0.0594)  
COOP HORZ 0.0339  0.0320  -0.0345  -0.0379  0.0338  0.0059  
 (0.0547)  (0.0576)  (0.0440)  (0.0424)  (0.0636)  (0.0639)  
COOP VERT 0.0257  0.0198  -0.1159 *** -0.1112 *** 0.1033 * 0.0914  
 (0.0521)  (0.0537)  (0.0406)  (0.0401)  (0.0587)  (0.0591)  
DISCRETE 0.0750  0.0634  0.1703 ** 0.1799 ** -0.2194 *** -0.2433 ***
 (0.0843)  (0.0864)  (0.0829)  (0.0873)  (0.0842)  (0.0904)  
HIGH TECH -0.0064  -0.0258  0.2272 ** 0.2485 ** -0.2272 ** -0.2227 ** 
 (0.0903)  (0.0930)  (0.1030)  (0.1162)  (0.0929)  (0.1056)  
MED HIGH TECH 0.0578  0.0661  0.0600  0.0726  -0.1587 * -0.1386  
 (0.0797)  (0.0837)  (0.0676)  (0.0705)  (0.0863)  (0.0909)  
R&D SERVICES -0.0086  -0.0144  0.1681 ** 0.1890 ** -0.1957 ** -0.1746 * 
  (0.0820)   (0.0857)   (0.0809)   (0.0901)   (0.0882)   (0.0958)   
*, **, *** signify significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence      
(Standard errors in parentheses)          
MLOGIT = multinomial logit          
 
 
We also computed the marginal effect of each variable on the three appropriability mecha-
nisms for specification 3 that includes the cooperation variables. Table 8 shows the marginal 
effects computed at the mean of the data set for both the probit and multinomial logit models.5 
Interestingly, there is little difference in the estimated marginal effect of each variable be-
tween the two estimation techniques. The largest impacts on the probability of choosing either 
speed or secrecy come from the technology and industry class variables, with nearly equal and 
opposite effects on each. Affiliation with discrete products, high technology, or R&D service 
                                                 
4   The multinomial logistic model combines SPEED and OTHER appropriability mechanisms.  
5   A marginal effect for dummy variables implies the change in probability when the dummy is turned on. 
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industries each increase the probability of choosing secrecy by 17, 23, and 17 percentage 
points, respectively. These same affiliations decrease the probability of choosing speed by 21, 
23, and 20 percentage points respectively.  
 
The sectoral and technology classes are interesting in that they explain a large degree of the 
differences between firms that choose secrecy and those that choose speed as their most im-
portant appropriability mechanism, but they are not choice variables for firms.  One of the few 
strategic drivers for the choice between secrecy and speed in this set of small innovative Fin-
nish firms seems to be the presence of a vertical R&D cooperative arrangement. This de-
creases the probability that a firm will choose secrecy as its most important appropriability 
mechanism by 11 percentage points and, according to the probit model, increases the prob-
ability of choosing speed by 10 percentage points. As argued previously, by sheer probability, 
these small firms are quite likely to partner with firms larger than themselves. We speculate 
that bargaining power differences make it difficult for the small firm to keep trade secrets or 
establish rights to emerging intellectual property. Speed to market may then be a more feasi-
ble means of appropriating the returns to R&D investment.   
 
We also estimated models using two-digit sector dummies in place of the technology classes 
we defined above. Other models were also estimated, where R&D expenditures were replaced 
with the ratio of R&D expenditures to the industry average R&D expenditure at the two-digit 
level to capture the possible effects of R&D expenditures relative to similar firms, given that 
the data set is quite diverse in terms of the number of industries surveyed.  None of these 
models changed or added significantly to our results.6  
 
                                                 
6  These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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5 Discussion and conclusion 
 
 
This study demonstrates that few of the smallest firms benefit from patenting, even if they are 
R&D intensive, innovative, cooperate in R&D, or operate in discrete or high technology in-
dustries. Only firm size explains the preference to use patents to protect innovations in our 
sample of small firms. Instead, the strategic choices for most small firms are between speed to 
market and secrecy. Speed is the appropriability method of choice for the smallest and for the 
highly R&D intensive firms, as well as for firms operating in lower technology industries and 
for firms that cooperate vertically in their innovation activities. In particular, cooperative ar-
rangements make it difficult to protect trade secrets; the recourse is to benefit from innovation 
by being faster than competitors. Moreover, our results suggest that only cooperative innova-
tion arrangements have implications for appropriability strategies, while simply being highly 
dependent on a vertical partner (a client or a supplier) in regular business activities does not. 
Secrecy, on the other hand, is preferred by firms offering products based on discrete (as op-
posed to complex) technologies and by firms with low R&D effort but operating in high tech-
nology or R&D based service industries. The result concerning discrete products industries is 
intuitive in that firms in these industries depend less on technological inputs from their peers 
and may thus be able to maintain secrecy. Horizontal flows of technological knowledge are 
likely to be more substantial in complex product industries such as electronics. 
 
These results for a sample consisting mostly of high or medium high technology manufacturing 
firms and R&D intensive service firms imply that our understanding of the workings of the in-
tellectual property rights system has to be revised when it comes to small firms. The patent sys-
tem is generally viewed as the cornerstone of socially beneficial incentives for innovative activ-
ity (and their partial disclosure), yet it appears to work remarkably poorly in protecting the re-
turns on innovation activities of the smallest firms. At the same time, however, innovative 
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SMEs are believed to be the key factor behind sustained growth of the economy and employ-
ment (e.g., European Commission, 2001, 2003, 2006; see also Audretsch, 2004). This raises 
some serious innovation policy questions. In particular, how can intellectual property rights 
policies encourage small firms’ innovation investments? Some possible solutions include that 
the patent system be modified to enable access for innovators without abundant resources to 
apply for and defend patents. For example, patenting fees could be defined on a sliding scale 
depending on the applicant's resources, and governments could provide or procure services for 
small innovators to obtain, defend, and enforce their patents, for example, in the context of na-
tional R&D programs. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) have also suggested insurance ar-
rangements against the risk of litigation for small firms. Other possible mechanisms include a 
European Patent Defense Union for SMEs as suggested by Kingston (2000).  
 
Another, perhaps more surprising, result from this current study is that most small innovating 
firms do not perceive secrecy as a very effective means to protect their intellectual assets. One 
of the key factors behind this is the engagement in cooperative vertical innovation arrange-
ments. As many innovative SMEs engage in cooperative R&D, and secrecy is difficult to 
maintain in joint projects while patents are too expensive to defend, the only recourse is to 
appropriate returns to innovation by quick market launch. Moreover, vertical cooperation ar-
rangements appear to have more significant repercussions for IPR strategies than do horizon-
tal ones. We speculate this has to do with the bargaining power differentials with and finan-
cial dependence on key suppliers and clients. Horizontal cooperation arrangements are rarely 
associated with equally significant dependence on external parties. Thus, for vertically coop-
erating small innovating firms, patenting is not an option because of resource constraints, 
while trade secrets are not feasible because of intensive interaction with and dependence on 
vertical innovation partners. The only recourse is to commercialize the results of R&D ahead 
of competitors who may receive spillovers through the vertical partners.  
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The relationship between vertical innovation cooperation and appropriability through speedy 
market access also has implications for innovation policy. In many European countries, 
Finland included, R&D subsidies are more readily available to firms with collaborative inno-
vation projects, with the idea that collaboration channels spillovers from publicly funded 
R&D to the rest of the economy. However, if these projects involve vertical relationships, 
then small firms are highly likely to attempt to speed up market launch rather than rely on se-
crecy or patents for protection. National innovation programs may thus influence the appro-
priability strategies of participating firms, depending on what kinds of mandates for inter-firm 
cooperation are specified. Our results would suggest that technology programs involving ver-
tical R&D cooperation might lead to faster commercialization than those with horizontal or no 
R&D cooperation. 
 
Whereas this study is based on a sample from a small European economy, many of its results 
are aligned with earlier studies with different kinds of samples. This increases our confidence 
in the generalizability of the results. The novelty of this research is its explicit focus on small 
firms and their vertical dependencies. The results obtained provide a striking view of the 
driver behind successful patenting—firm size—and the recourse by small firms to alternative 
means for appropriating the returns on their innovation investments—in the majority of cases 
speed to market. Indeed, the sampled firms on average find trade secrets, too, to be difficult to 
benefit from. We thus conclude that the emphasis on patents in the debates concerning the 
institutional environment for innovation may be misplaced. More theoretical and empirical 
research is needed into the implications for market, R&D investment, and innovation out-
comes of speed to market as the key appropriability mechanism for small firms. Finally, while 
our study benefited from time lags of the main explanatory variables thus reducing the simul-
taneity bias, except in the case of the cooperative innovation variables, future research could 
carry out these kinds of analyses in a longitudinal setting to account for any remaining en-
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dogeneities. For example, the mechanisms behind the results on vertical cooperative innova-
tion activities would be interesting to examine in more detail. The significance of vertical in-
novation arrangements over other vertical partnerships may in part be driven by simultaneity 
of the cooperation and appropriability variables. This could be assessed with longitudinal 
data. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Table A1 Summary statistics for all available data 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N 
R&D expenditures (Euros) 66705.4 191037.9 0 2356906 635 
EMPLOYEES 12.9328 16.0398 1 100 774 
EXPORTS 0.3760 0.4847 0 1 774 
PRODUCT INNOVATION 0.2209 0.4151 0 1 774 
PROCESS INNOVATION 0.0840 0.2775 0 1 774 
BOTH INNOVATION 0.2119 0.4089 0 1 774 
PARTNER 0.5090 0.5002 0 1 774 
COOP HORZ 0.6745 0.4691 0 1 427 
COOP VERT 0.5012 0.5006 0 1 427 
DISCRETE 0.2132 0.4098 0 1 774 
HIGH TECH 0.1061 0.3082 0 1 754 
MED HIGH TECH 0.2732 0.4459 0 1 754 
R&D SERVICES 0.2016 0.4015 0 1 754 
PATENTS 0.2745 0.4466 0 1 674 
SECRECY 0.1677 0.3738 0 1 674 
SPEED 0.5579 0.4970 0 1 674 
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Table A2  Sample correlations 
  R&D expenditures EMPLOYEES EXPORTS
PRODUCT 
INNOVATION 
PROCESS IN-
NOVATION
BOTH IN-
NOVATION PARTNER
COOP 
HORZ
EMPLOYEES 0.2483 1.0000  
EXPORTS 0.2981 0.2517 1.0000  
PROD INNOVATION 0.1456 0.0160 0.0786 1.0000 
PROC INNOVATION 0.0299 0.0004 -0.0444 -0.1867 1.0000
BOTH INNOVATION 0.2167 0.0888 0.0838 -0.4606 -0.2056 1.0000
PARTNER -0.0991 -0.1473 -0.0898 0.0422 0.0000 -0.0610 1.0000
COOP HORZ 0.1488 0.0844 0.1198 0.0441 -0.0235 0.1484 0.0203 1.0000
COOP VERT 0.1136 -0.0678 0.0646 0.0173 -0.0352 0.0608 -0.0128 0.1021
DISCRETE -0.0329 0.1451 0.0323 -0.0955 0.1138 0.0983 -0.0269 0.0155
HIGH TECH 0.0188 0.0077 -0.0404 0.0946 0.0869 -0.1765 0.0821 0.0221
MED HIGH TECH 0.1771 0.1121 0.3176 0.1059 -0.0548 0.0898 -0.1125 0.0143
R&D SERVICES 0.1800 -0.0686 -0.1836 0.0429 -0.1025 0.0308 0.0497 -0.0007
PATENTS 0.0588 0.2005 0.1302 -0.0010 0.0125 0.0212 -0.0360 0.0549
SECRECY -0.1253 -0.0125 -0.1417 -0.1148 0.1326 0.0153 -0.0087 -0.0887
SPEED 0.0319 -0.1131 0.0063 0.0885 -0.0703 -0.0836 0.0705 0.0294
  COOP VERT DISCRETE HIGH TECH MED HIGH TECH 
R&D SER-
VICES PATENTS SECRECY SPEED
DISCRETE -0.0431 1.0000  
HIGH TECH -0.0249 -0.0964 1.0000  
MED HIGH TECH -0.0530 -0.0365 -0.2655 1.0000 
R&D SERVICES 0.0680 -0.2661 -0.2594 -0.4085 1.0000
PATENTS 0.0125 0.0844 -0.0258 0.0937 -0.0677 1.0000
SECRECY -0.1818 0.1046 0.0899 -0.0768 0.0279 -0.2705 1.0000
SPEED 0.1221 -0.1317 -0.0430 -0.0240 0.0111 -0.6080 -0.4392 1.0000
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